基于博弈理論的無線自組織網(wǎng)增強(qiáng)協(xié)作模型研究

李添澤; 武穆清; 李沛哲; 廖文星; 馬偉

doi:10.11999/JEIT150356

基于博弈理論的無線自組織網(wǎng)增強(qiáng)協(xié)作模型研究

doi: 10.11999/JEIT150356 cstr: 32379.14.JEIT150356

基金項(xiàng)目:

網(wǎng)絡(luò)體系架構(gòu)與融合北京市重點(diǎn)實(shí)驗(yàn)室主任基金(2015BKL-NSAC-ZJ-06)

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- 文章訪問數(shù): 1364
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- 被引次數(shù): 0
出版歷程
- 收稿日期: 2015-03-25
- 修回日期: 2015-08-28
- 刊出日期: 2015-12-19

Ad hoc Network Cooperation Enforcement Model Based on Game Theory

Funds:

The Director Funds of Laboratory of Network System Architecture and Convergence (2015BKL-NSAC-ZJ-06)

摘要

摘要: 為了解決無線自組織網(wǎng)絡(luò)中轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)節(jié)點(diǎn)因自身能量與存儲空間限制而拒絕協(xié)作的自私性問題，該文從分析數(shù)據(jù)包源節(jié)點(diǎn)與轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)節(jié)點(diǎn)的收益與開銷特性出發(fā)，基于虛擬貨幣的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制，結(jié)合博弈理論提出無線自組織網(wǎng)絡(luò)增強(qiáng)協(xié)作模型。該模型將網(wǎng)絡(luò)協(xié)作問題轉(zhuǎn)化為數(shù)據(jù)包轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)路徑中多轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)節(jié)點(diǎn)與源節(jié)點(diǎn)收益的博弈均衡問題，在保障雙方利益的基礎(chǔ)上提出最優(yōu)的激勵(lì)方式，促進(jìn)通信協(xié)作的進(jìn)行。另外，為最大化網(wǎng)絡(luò)生存時(shí)間與避免擁塞，該模型對轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)節(jié)點(diǎn)的電量與存儲空間狀態(tài)做了相應(yīng)的約束。
- 無線自組織網(wǎng) /
- 自私性 /
- 增強(qiáng)協(xié)作 /
- 博弈 /
- 虛擬貨幣
Abstract: In order to solve the selfishness problem that forwarding nodes in the wireless ad hoc network refuse to cooperation due to the limit of energy and storage space, a wireless ad hoc network cooperation enhancement model combined with the game theory is proposed, which is based on the incentive mechanism of virtual currency, analysis the benefit and overhead characteristics of the source nodes and forwarding nodes. In this model, the network cooperation problem is transformed into a game equilibrium problem about the benefit of source node and forwarding nodes in the data forwarding path, promoting the cooperation of communication. Furthermore, in order to avoid the congestion and maximizing network lifetime, the model makes some certain constraint about the energy and storage space for the forwarding nodes.
- Ad hoc network /
- Selfishness /
- Cooperation enforcement /
- Game theory /
- Virtual currency

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