兩個認(rèn)證密鑰協(xié)商協(xié)議的前向安全性分析
doi: 10.11999/JEIT211137 cstr: 32379.14.JEIT211137
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戰(zhàn)略支援部隊信息工程大學(xué) 鄭州 450001
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數(shù)學(xué)工程與先進計算國家重點實驗室 鄭州 450001
基金項目: 國家自然科學(xué)基金(61872449)
Cryptoanalysis on the Forward Security of Two Authenticated Key Protocols
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Strategic Support Force Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
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State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing, Zhengzhou 450001, China
Funds: The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61872449)
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摘要: 目前，網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全及隱私受到廣泛關(guān)注。前向安全性是Günther在1989年提出的一種認(rèn)證密鑰協(xié)商協(xié)議( AKA)的安全屬性(doi: 10.1007/3-540-46885-4_5)，該性質(zhì)經(jīng)過30年的蓬勃發(fā)展已經(jīng)成為研究領(lǐng)域的熱點之一。該文主要分析了MZK20和VSR20兩個AKA協(xié)議。首先在啟發(fā)式分析的基礎(chǔ)上，利用BAN邏輯分析了MZK20協(xié)議不具有弱前向安全性；其次利用啟發(fā)式分析和Scyther工具證明了VSR20協(xié)議不具備前向安全性。最后，在分析VSR20協(xié)議設(shè)計缺陷的基礎(chǔ)上，提出了改進方案，并在eCK模型下證明了改進后協(xié)議的安全性；并且，結(jié)合Scyther軟件證明了改進VSR20協(xié)議與VSR20協(xié)議相比明顯提高了安全性。
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關(guān)鍵詞:
- 安全協(xié)議形式化工具分析 /
- 認(rèn)證密鑰協(xié)商協(xié)議 /
- 前向安全性
Abstract: At present, network security and privacy have attracted extensive attention. Forward security is a security attribute of Authenticated Key Agreement protocol (AKA) proposed by Günther in 1989. Since then, this property has become one of the hot topics. This paper analyzes the security properties of two AKA protocols, MZK20 and VSR20. First, based on heuristic analysis and BAN logic, MZK20 protocol is proved that it does not satisfy weak forward security. Second, using heuristic analysis and Scyther, it is proved that VSR20 protocol does not fulfill forward security. Finally, the enhanced VSR20 protocol is designed and proved more secure than VSR20. The security of the modified VSR20 is verified both by the use of security reduction under eCK model and Scyther. -
表 1 BAN邏輯分析MZK20協(xié)議
MZK20協(xié)議期望達成的目標(biāo)如下(參與雙方用$ {{\text{S}}_j} $和$ {{\text{U}}_u} $表示，$ {K_{uj}} $表示雙方達成的會話密鑰)：
G1. $ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;{K_{uj}} $;
G2. $ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;{K_{uj}}) $;
G3. $ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;{K_{uj}} $;
G4. $ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;{K_{uj}}) $.消息：
$ {\text{Message}}\,{\text{1}}\quad {{\text{U}}_u} \to {{\text{S}}_j}: < {\{ {\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}\} _{{K_u}}},{\{ {C_u}\} _{{K_S}}} > $;
$ {\text{Message}}\,{\text{2}}\quad {{\text{S}}_j} \to {{\text{U}}_u}: < {D_j}{ > _{ < {\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}{ > _{{K_{{\text{RC}}}}}}}} $;假設(shè)：
A1.$ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;{\text{fresh}}({C_u}) $，$ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;{\text{fresh}}({D_j}) $;
A2.$ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;{C_u} $，$ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;{D_j} $;
A3.$ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\mathop \Leftrightarrow \limits^{{K_u}} {{\text{S}}_j}) $，$ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\mathop \Leftrightarrow \limits^{{K_u}} {{\text{S}}_j}) $;
A4.$ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{controls}}\;{K_{uj}}) $，$ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{controls}}\;{K_{uj}}) $;
A5.$ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;{K_{{\text{RC}}}} $，$ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;{K_{{\text{RC}}}} $.推理過程：
F1. $ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{sees}}\; < {\{ {\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}\} _{{K_u}}},{\{ {C_u}\} _{{K_S}}} > $;
F2. $ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{sees}}\;{\{ I{D_u}\} _{{K_u}}} $，$ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{sees}}\;{\{ {C_u}\} _{{K_s}}} $;
F3. $ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{said}}\;{\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}) $，$ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{said}}\;{C_u}) $($ {\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u} = {C_u}P \oplus {\text{PI}}{{\text{D}}_u} $, $ {X_u} = h({\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}||{\text{p}}{{\text{k}}_{{\text{RC}}}}) $且$ {\text{PI}}{{\text{D}}_u} = {\{ {\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}\} _{{K_u}}} $);
F4. $ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;{C_u}) $，$ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;{X_u}) $;
F5. $ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;{K_{uj}}) $($ {K_{uj}} = {\text{S}}{{\text{K}}_{uj}} = h({\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}||{C_u}P||{D_j}||{X_u}||{\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_j}) $);
F6. $ {{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{believes}}\;{K_{uj}} $;
F7. $ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{sees}}\; < {D_j}{ > _{ < {\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}{ > _{{K_{{\text{RC}}}}}}}} $;
F8. $ {{\text{U}}_u}\;{\text{believes}}\;({{\text{S}}_j}\;{\text{said}}\;{D_j}) $($ {K_{uj}} = {\text{S}}{{\text{K}}_{uj}} = h({\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_u}||{C_u}P||{D_j}||{X_u}||{\text{I}}{{\text{D}}_j}) $).
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