一種輕量級(jí)數(shù)據(jù)加密標(biāo)準(zhǔn)循環(huán)掩碼實(shí)現(xiàn)方案

王立輝; 閆守禮; 李清

doi:10.11999/JEIT190870

一種輕量級(jí)數(shù)據(jù)加密標(biāo)準(zhǔn)循環(huán)掩碼實(shí)現(xiàn)方案

doi: 10.11999/JEIT190870 cstr: 32379.14.JEIT190870

王立輝²,
閆守禮²,
李清^{1, 2, ,}

1.
復(fù)旦大學(xué)專(zhuān)用集成電路與系統(tǒng)國(guó)家重點(diǎn)實(shí)驗(yàn)室上海 201203
2.
上海復(fù)旦微電子集團(tuán)股份有限公司上海 200433

基金項(xiàng)目: 十三五預(yù)先研究項(xiàng)目(3110105-09)

詳細(xì)信息

作者簡(jiǎn)介:
王立輝：男，1982年生，博士，高級(jí)工程師，研究方向?yàn)槊艽a芯片安全設(shè)計(jì)

閆守禮：男，1972年生，碩士，工程師，研究方向?yàn)槊艽a芯片安全設(shè)計(jì)

李清：女，1968年生，碩士，教授級(jí)高級(jí)工程師，研究方向?yàn)槊艽a芯片安全設(shè)計(jì)

通訊作者:
李清　liqing@fmsh.com.cn

中圖分類(lèi)號(hào): TN918.4
計(jì)量
- 文章訪問(wèn)數(shù): 1839
- HTML全文瀏覽量: 1067
- PDF下載量: 104
- 被引次數(shù): 0
出版歷程
- 收稿日期: 2019-11-01
- 修回日期: 2020-06-06
- 網(wǎng)絡(luò)出版日期: 2020-07-07
- 刊出日期: 2020-08-18

A Lightweight Implementation Scheme of Data Encryption Standard with Cyclic Mask

Lihui WANG²,
Shouli YAN²,
Qing LI^{1, 2
, ,}

1.
State Key Laboratory of ASIC and System, Fudan University, Shanghai 201203, China
2.
Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Group Company Limited, Shanghai 200433, China

Funds: The 13th Five-Year Plan Advance Reserch Projects Fund of China (3110105-09)

摘要

摘要: 隨著智能卡技術(shù)的不斷發(fā)展，智能卡芯片的安全性也面臨越來(lái)越大的挑戰(zhàn)。在眾多加密算法中，數(shù)據(jù)加密標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(DES)算法是一種應(yīng)用較廣的對(duì)稱(chēng)加解密算法。為了抵御各種側(cè)信道攻擊，使用最為廣泛的是在算法中通過(guò)掩碼技術(shù)來(lái)消除真實(shí)密鑰和功耗相關(guān)性，該文提出一種新的適用于DES的循環(huán)掩碼方案，和之前文獻(xiàn)中的預(yù)計(jì)算掩碼方案相比，不僅預(yù)計(jì)算量大大減少，而且整個(gè)DES運(yùn)算過(guò)程的中間數(shù)據(jù)都是帶有掩碼的，把掩碼拆分后，還可以防護(hù)高階攻擊。
- 數(shù)據(jù)加密標(biāo)準(zhǔn) /
- 側(cè)信道攻擊 /
- 掩碼
Abstract: With the continuous development of smart card technology, the security of smart card chip is facing more and more challenges. Among many encryption algorithms, Data Encryption Standard(DES) algorithm is a widely used symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm. In order to resist all kinds of side channel attacks, the most widely used method is to eliminate correlation of the real key and power consumption through the masking technology in the algorithm. A new cyclic mask scheme for DES is proposed. Compared with the pre-calculated mask scheme in the previous literature, not only the pre-calculation amount is greatly reduced, but also the intermediate data in the whole DES operation process is masked. After the mask is split, it can also protect against high-order attacks.
- Data Encryption Standard(DES) /
- Side channel attack /
- Mask

HTML全文

圖 1 DES加密流程

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 2 F函數(shù)

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 3 5種不同的輪函數(shù)

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 4 循環(huán)掩碼方案

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 5 SASEBO-GII開(kāi)發(fā)板

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 6 DES的首輪攻擊位置

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

圖 7 DES的尾輪攻擊位置

下載: 全尺寸圖片幻燈片

表 1 不同方案的詳細(xì)比較

方案	存儲(chǔ)空間(Byte)	預(yù)計(jì)算時(shí)間(clk)	安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)
文獻(xiàn)[17]方案	1536	384	極性DPA，選擇明文的2階攻擊
文獻(xiàn)[18]方案	1536	384	極性DPA
本文方案	1024	256	無(wú)

下載: 導(dǎo)出CSV

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