自私性移動(dòng)P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)中節(jié)點(diǎn)激勵(lì)策略研究
doi: 10.11999/JEIT161335 cstr: 32379.14.JEIT161335
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1.
(湖南人文科技學(xué)院信息學(xué)院 婁底 417000) ②(中南大學(xué)信息科學(xué)與工程學(xué)院 長(zhǎng)沙 410083) ③(湖南師范大學(xué)物理與信息科學(xué)學(xué)院 長(zhǎng)沙 410081)
國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金(61572191, 61571188 ),湖南省自然科學(xué)基金(2017JJ2124),湖南省教育廳優(yōu)秀青年科研項(xiàng)目 (15B125),湖南省計(jì)算機(jī)應(yīng)用技術(shù)重點(diǎn)建設(shè)學(xué)科資助項(xiàng)目
Research on Node Incentive Protocol in Selfish Mobile Peer-to-peer Network
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1.
(Institute of Information, Hunan University of Humanities, Science and Technology, Loudi 417000, China)
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2.
(School of Information Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)
The National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572191, 61571188), The Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province (2017JJ2124), The Outstanding Youth Scientific Research Foundation of Department of Education, Hunan Province (15B125), The Key Construction Course of Computer Application Technology in Hunan Province
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摘要: 該文針對(duì)移動(dòng)P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)中節(jié)點(diǎn)表現(xiàn)出來(lái)的自私性,并結(jié)合移動(dòng)P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò)的資源受限、自組織以及開(kāi)放性等特點(diǎn),提出一種基于不完全信息的雙方叫價(jià)拍賣模型的節(jié)點(diǎn)激勵(lì)策略DAIP。該激勵(lì)策略采用虛擬貨幣的支付方式,節(jié)點(diǎn)根據(jù)其擁有的虛擬貨幣量、自身資源狀態(tài)和消息屬性對(duì)每次消息轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)進(jìn)行估價(jià),然后根據(jù)估價(jià)與博弈策略給出相應(yīng)報(bào)價(jià)。通過(guò)博弈分析給出了DAIP策略的線性策略貝葉斯納什均衡解,使各節(jié)點(diǎn)為最大化其自身利益而積極參與消息轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)合作,從而促進(jìn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)系統(tǒng)中消息轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)合作的成功。分析與實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明該激勵(lì)策略能夠降低系統(tǒng)的能量消耗,提高整個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)系統(tǒng)的消息轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)成功率,提高系統(tǒng)的整體效用。
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關(guān)鍵詞:
- 移動(dòng)P2P網(wǎng)絡(luò) /
- 自私性 /
- 拍賣模型 /
- 虛擬貨幣 /
- 激勵(lì)策略
Abstract: In view of the selfishness of nodes in mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, combined with its features of the resource-constrained, self-organization and opening, this paper proposes a novel Incentive Protocol DAIP of mobile P2P network based on Double Auction model of incomplete information on both sides. The incentive mechanism adopts virtual currency payment method. The node calculates the evaluation of a message forwarding based on the virtual currency, resource state of it and the property of message, then gives the corresponding price according to the evaluation and game strategy. Through the game analysis, the linear strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium solution of DAIP strategy is given, which makes each node to maximize its own benefits, encourages them to cooperate with the message forwarding, and then improves the success rate of message forwarding in the network system. Analysis and simulation show that this incentive mechanism is able to effectively reduce the system's energy consumption, improve the success rate of message forwarding in the whole network system, and improve the overall effectiveness of the system.-
Key words:
- Mobile Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network /
- Selfishness /
- Auction model /
- Virtual currency /
- Incentive protocol
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